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Abstract
In most advanced countries, future retirees will have to rely less on social security
schemes and more on private pension plans, which mostly leave to the worker the choice
between cashing-in or annuitizing pension wealth at retirement. Therefore, a better
understanding of the determinants of the demand for annuities will soon become a priority.
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1. Introduction
1
An annuity is an insurance contract in which, in exchange for a premium up-front, the
insurer promises a stream of payments to the client which stops only if the person insured dies.
Therefore, the client who buys an annuity is able to transform pension wealth at retirement into
a regular life-long stream of bene￿ts.
It is a well-established result in economic theory that risk-averse individuals should
annuitize a signi￿cant part of their wealth.
2 The intuition behind this result is straightforward,
and rooted in the life cycle model (Modigliani, 1986). Consider a worker on the verge of
retirement who has to choose the level of consumption for the coming years, given their level
of wealth. Without annuities, workers would be exposed to both sides of longevity risk: if they
live longer than expected, they could outlive their resources; if on the contrary their lifespan
turns out to be shorter than expected, some resources are wasted. Buying an annuity, longevity
risk is shifted onto the insurance company. As companies have a wide pool of clients, they can
diversify away the idiosyncratic component of the longevity risk,
3 so they can offer annuities
at a price which is reasonably priced for the individual client.
As is well known, social security wealth, which typically constitutes the biggest share of
a retiree’s wealth, comes in an annuitized form. However, in most advanced countries, future
retirees will have to rely less on social security schemes and more on funded pension plans (see
Feldstein and Siebert, 2002, Diamond and Orszag, 2004), which mostly leave to the worker
the choice between cashing-out or annuitizing pension wealth at retirement. Within employer-
sponsored pension plans, the shift from de￿ned bene￿t (DB) schemes (which mostly require
annuitization at retirement) to de￿ned contribution (DC) schemes (which often do not even
have annuitization as an option) raises similar concerns. Therefore, a better understanding of
the demand for annuities will soon become a priority for policy-makers and regulators.
1 We are grateful to Daniele Franco, Giorgio Gobbi, Sandro Momigliano and Federica Teppa for encour-
agement and many helpful suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at the Netspar Pension workshop and
at the ECB. The views expressed in the paper are our own, and do not necessarily re￿ect those of the Bank of
Italy.
2 Yaari (1965). More recently, see Davidoff et al. (2005) and Sheshinski (2007).
3 They only have to bear the aggregate component, i.e. the risk of unpredicted changes in the average
lifespan (Visco, 2006).6
In this paper, we propose a way to estimate the annuity demand schedule. We use data
from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a large representative survey of
the Italian population conducted by the Bank of Italy every two years. In the 2008 wave, all
heads of household were asked the following question:
4
"Imagine you are 65 years old and receive a total pension income of 1,000 euros a
month (adjusted for in￿ation). Would you be willing to give up half that pension
for the whole of your old age in exchange for a lump sum of 60,000 euros to be
paid immediately?"
Respondents who preferred the annuity to the lump-sum were then asked the same
question with the lump-sum increased to 80,000 euros; those who still preferred the annuity to
the 80,000 euros lump-sum were asked again the same question with the lump-sum increased
to 100,000 euros. The 80,000 euros payment corresponds to the price which would leave a
risk-neutral 65 year-old married male indifferent between buying and not buying the annuity,
considering the most up-to-date of￿cial mortality rates
5 and a 3 per cent real interest rate.
Answers to this battery of questions represent our dependent variable.
To date, it has proved very dif￿cult to assess annuity demand and its determinants,
mainly due to the fact that annuity markets are very thin (in most countries individual demand
is basically non existent).
6 To the best of our knowledge, there are only two other papers which
study annuitization choices at retirement. Brown (2001) considers a subgroup of respondents
in the 1992 wave of the US Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) which covers people aged
51-61, namely those with a signi￿cant amount of wealth invested in a DC pension plan,
and exploits answers to a prospective question, namely: "In what form do you expect to
receive bene￿ts?". He then estimates a probit model in which the binary dependent variable
is the intention to annuitize. He ￿nds that the basic tenets of the theory are con￿rmed,
as married people with higher risk aversion, longer life expectancy and a smaller fraction
of pre-annuitized retirement wealth tend to prefer annuitization. Butler and Teppa (2007)
4 The questions of the module are similar to those included in the 2004 wave of the US Health and Retire-
ment Survey (HRS).
5 We used the of￿cial life tables provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), which
computes cohort-speci￿c mortality rates.
6 Surveys of annuity market development around the world can be found in James and Song (2002),
Mackenzie, (2006), and Cannon and Tonks (2008).7
perform the same exercise as Brown (2001), but using actual choices instead of intentions: in
particular they consider administrative data about annuitization choices at retirement of Swiss
workers enrolled in 10 employer-sponsored pension plans. With respect to survey questions,
administrative data have their pros and cons: on one side, they are certainly more reliable; on
the other side, they usually provide much less information about the worker. Their results are
also in line with Brown (2001).
The paper by Hurd and Panis (2006) is also relevant; its methodology and results are
analogous to Brown (2001) and Butler and Teppa (2007). However, it does not distinguish
between annuitization choices at the moment of retirement and those made when the worker
changes job but stays in the labour force (which is the case for about 40% of the observations
in their sample). Hurd and Panis use HRS data from the ￿ve waves between 1992-2000.
7
These contributions share some limitations: (1) they do not study a representative sample
of the underlying population; (2) they observe annuitization choices but cannot disentangle
the demand from the supply of annuities, as they do not control for annuity prices; and (3)
they either do not observe the fraction of annuitized wealth held outside private pension plans
(Butler and Teppa, 2007, Hurd and Panis, 2006) or they measure it very imperfectly (Brown,
2001).
8
The empirical approach adopted in this paper largely avoids these drawbacks. First, we
use a sample which is representative of a large subgroup of the Italian population (namely,
Italian heads of household), which constitutes an important component of the Italian labour
force. Second, experimenting with different annuity prices enables us to elicit the shape of the
annuity demand schedule. Third, making the total amount of annuity bene￿ts explicit solves
the problem of controlling for differences in annuitized wealth.
Our paper also contributes to the very small literature which explores the role of ￿nancial
literacy and more generally behavioural factors on the decision to annuitize. This research
avenue has been strongly advocated by Brown (2007, 2008). While in his survey (Brown,
7 Respondents were asked if they had done anything with a pension right since the previous wave.
8 Brown (2001) reconstructs social security wealth using social security data on earnings and bene￿ts his-
tories included in the HRS. However, these data are missing for about 1/3 of the sample. Moreover, he has to
assume that the fraction of wealth annuitized at retirement is equal to that observed at the moment of the survey.
He also assumes that all retirement wealth in DB plans will be annuitized.8
2007) he asserts that "the literature applying behavioural economics to the annuitization
decision has still to emerge", a couple of important contributions have been published since
then (Brown et al. 2008, Agnew et al. 2008). Both papers show the importance of "framing"
effects in shaping annuity demand. In the present paper, we focus instead on the effects of
education and of ￿nancial literacy.
9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our data; in Section 3
we perform a more formal multivariate analysis; Section 4 discusses some implications of our
results and offers some tentative conclusions.
2. Data, variables and descriptive statistics
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), is a representative survey of the
Italian population conducted by the Bank of Italy every two years. It includes information on
the socio-demographic characteristics, income and wealth of about 20,000 participants. For
the 2008 wave of the survey we included a module on the demand for annuities which was
completed by all heads of household at least 15 years old. Total respondents were 7,124 out
of 7,977 heads of household. Overall, the non-response rate is quite low, and there seem to
be no systematic differences between respondents and non-respondents. Table 1 provides a
description of our sample. We should stress that, while it is representative of Italian heads of
household, it is not representative of the Italian labour force. In particular, among heads of
household there are relatively few women and young people (and by consequence relatively
few singles and people without children). On the other hand, there seem to be no differences
between the heads of household and the labour force when it comes to health and education
(see Table 2 for a description of the Italian labour force as it emerges from the SHIW data).
We use the survey data to construct an indicator of the preference for annuities, which
is a discrete variable taking the value of 1 for respondents who say no to the annuity even at
the lowest price (60,000); 2 for those who prefer the annuity at the lowest price but reject it
at a higher price; 3 for those who prefer the annuity at the middle price (80,000) but will not
buy it at the highest price; and 4 for those who opt for the annuity even at the highest price
(100,000).
9 Among others, Lusardi (2008a, b) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) convincingly argue that poor ￿nancial
knowledge is the rule, rather than the exception, and that it has a signi￿cant impact on households’ ￿nancial
choices and outcomes.9
Answers to the annuity module are summarized in Table 3, which focuses on individuals
less than 65 years old (this makes sense given the structure of the question, however we
checked that results do not change qualitatively if all respondents are included). The
percentage who preferred the annuity against a lump sum of 80,000 euros is 69%. This
percentage rises to 82% when the price of the annuity is reduced to 60,000 and falls to 40%
when the price increases to 100,000.
As a ￿rst step, we look at simple unconditional correlations between our measure of
annuity preference and some individual and household characteristics which economic theory
singles out as potentially relevant.
Some of the results of the univariate analysis are at odds with the standard version of the
life-cycle theory. First, women and younger cohorts do not seem to prefer annuities more than
men and older cohorts (in the case of young people, quite the contrary is true), as should be
the case since both groups enjoy a higher life expectancy at retirement, which in turn implies
that the expected present value of a given stream of life-long payments is higher. Second,
marital status and the presence of children does not in￿uence annuity demand.
10 This result
holds even if attention is restricted to senior people (aged between 50 and 65), for whom
actual family status is likely to be equal to the one expected at 65. According to the theory,
however, married people and people with children should have a reduced annuity demand, as
they can at least in part obtain insurance against longevity risk within the family, either for
altruistic of for self-interested reasons (e.g. through implicit contracts across generations, as
in Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981). Third, our measure of annuity preference does not increase
with risk aversion,
11 even if the insurance against longevity risk provided by annuity contracts
should be particularly valued by risk-averse individuals.
Other results are instead in line with the theory. First, health status has a strong positive
impact on annuity demand (for example, against an 80,000 euro lump sum, 72% of people
who report they are in "very good health" choose to annuitize; this ￿gure goes down to
10 These results con￿rm similar ￿ndings by Butler and Teppa (2007) and Johnson et al (2004).
11 Our proxy for risk adversion comes from a survey question included in the SHIW: "In managing your
￿nancial investments, would you say you have a preference for investments that offer: a) Very high returns, but
with a high risk of losing part of the capital; b) A good return, but also a fair degree of protection for the invested
capital; c) A fair return, with a good degree of protection for the invested capital; d) Low returns, with a low risk
of losing the invested capital."10
63% for those with a health status self-reportedly worse than "good"). Indeed the life-cycle
model predicts that people in good shape should value annuities relatively more, as they
expect to receive a higher number of annuity payments. Second, higher income and higher
wealth come with an increased propensity to annuitize, with a stronger effect at the bottom
of the distribution. From a theoretical point of view, this ￿nding has two complementary
explanations: (i) to reach a given desired fraction of annuitized wealth, wealthier people need
to buy a greater amount of annuities; (ii) poorer people should optimally annuitize a lower
fraction of their wealth, because they have a higher probability of incurring a binding liquidity
constraint sometime during retirement. In general it is not possible to borrow against future
annuitypayments. There￿re, peoplewhofearbecomingliquidity-constrainedatacertainpoint
during retirement (for example due to out-of-pocket medical expenditures) should prefer not
to annuitize their pension wealth (Turra and Mitchell, 2005). Of course our interpretation
of the data carries through to the extent that today’s health and wealth are correlated to the
expectations of the respondents concerning their own health and wealth at 65. Therefore, as
we did for family status, we checked that the results for health and wealth are not affected if
we focus on the 51-65 age class. Third, we ￿nd that people who discount future consumption
at a higher rate tend to prefer a lump sum over the annuity, where we use as a proxy for the
time discount rate the participants’ answer to the following question:
12
"You have won the lottery and will receive a sum equal to your household’s
net yearly revenue. You will receive the money in a year’s time. However, if you
give up part of the sum you can collect the rest of your win immediately. To obtain
the money immediately would you give up 20 per cent of your win?" What about
10 per cent?" "And 5 per cent?" "Just 2 per cent?".
How can one make sense of the mixed support that the data seem to provide for the
life cycle model? Actually, the model is based on the assumption that households are able to
make the annuitization decision based on a full evaluation of the effects and likelihood of all
relevant future events, maximizing the expected discounted value of present and future utility.
However, there is a lot of evidence showing that many individuals are not able to do even
simple economic computations, and lack knowledge of even the most basic economic concepts
(Lusardi 2008a, 2008b). This could explain some of the above-mentioned correlations: for
12 The question was put to a randomized subset of our sample (about 1,000 people). See also Warner and
Pleeter (2001) for a similar result.11
example, older people might have a higher propensity to annuitize because they have already
spent more time planning for retirement, so they are better equipped to understand annuities
and their advantages. The negative correlation between risk aversion and annuity demand can
also be due to behavioural biases. In particular, Brown et al. (2008) ￿nd the same relationship
as we do looking at US survey data, and argue that some people might incorrectly interpret (or
"frame") an annuity as a bet on one’s life span, instead of a hedge against longevity risk.
One of the ￿rst signs of the importance of cognitive factors is that higher education
comes with a greater propensity to annuitize: 64% of participants with primary education
say they would prefer the annuity to a lump sum of 80,000 euros; this ￿gure rises to 77%
for those with a bachelor’s or higher degree. To better assess the role of ￿nancial literacy in
explaining annuity demand, we included some ad hoc questions in the Bank of Italy’s Survey.
In particular, we build a ￿rst dummy variable which equals 1 if the respondent answers the
following question correctly:
"Imagine leaving 1,000 euros in a current account that pays 1% interest and has no
charges. Imagine that in￿ation is running at 2%. Do you think that if you withdraw
the money in a year’s time you will be able to buy the same amount of goods as if
you spent the 1,000 euros today?
a) Yes;
b) No, I will be able to buy less;
c) No, I will be able to buy more;
d) Don’t know."
The second dummy is equal to one if the respondent answers correctly to the following
question:
"Which of the following investment strategies do you think entails the greatest risk
of losing your capital?
a) Investing in the shares of a single company;
b) Investing in the shares of more than one company;
c) Don’t know."
These two questions were ￿rst used in the 2004 HRS survey (Lusardi and Mitchell,
2006). They assess the knowledge of very basic economic concepts (interest rates, in￿ation,
risk diversi￿cation) which are crucial to evaluate correctly if an annuity is better value than a12
lump sum. Indeed, people who respond incorrectly to the ￿rst question may not understand
that the real returns of some asset classes (like a simple bank deposit) are dented by in￿ation:
this might induce them to underestimate the value of a real annuity (like the one offered
to our respondents). People responding incorrectly to the second question may not be able
to understand the principle of portfolio diversi￿cation, so they are unlikely to pro￿t from
investing in ￿nancial markets: for them, the value of a lump sum (which depends on how it is
invested during the post-retirement period) might be low relative to the value of the annuity. In
linewiththesetheoreticalpredictions, annuitydemandishigherforpeopleansweringcorrectly
to the ￿rst question and lower for those answering correctly to the second.
13
We also consider a further dimension of ￿nancial literacy, measuring to what extent
respondents understand the basic features of the Italian private pension system. This is likely
to be relevant to the decision to annuitize, as private pension plans are the main ￿nancial
instruments offering a pay-out in an annuity form. In particular, we consider the number of
correct answers that the respondent gives to the following question:
"Which of the following statements concerning supplementary pension
schemes do you believe to be true? 1) Investing in a supplementary pension
plan has tax advantages compared with investment funds in general. 2) Part of
the capital can be withdrawn at the time of retirement. 3) Some pension funds
guarantee restitution of the capital paid in. 4) Pension funds guarantee a ￿xed
percentage of the last salary."
Those who perform badly in this test of pension literacy are less likely to choose the
annuity.
13 The point that the relationship between annuity demand and ￿nancial literacy can go in either direction
has been stressed by Brown (2007, 2008) and by Agnew et al. (2008).13
3. Multivariate analysis
3.1 From theory to data
In this section, we assess to what extent the simple correlation results highlighted above
are robust to a more formal multivariate analysis. To motivate our empirical strategy, let us
recap very brie￿y how an individual who behaves according to the prescriptions of the simplest
version of the life cycle model should answer our survey question about the annuity/lump sum
choice. For simplicity, let us consider an unmarried individual for whom longevity is the only
source of uncertainty (the framework could easily be enriched to take into account bequest
motives, uncertain rates of return, and the possibility of out-of-pocket expenses).
If agent i does not accept our deal to swap half of their pension with a lump sum LS,











Wit+1 = (1 + ri)Wit + 1;000 ￿ Cit for t ￿ 65 (1)
Wi65 = accumulated wealth at 65 for i,
where ￿i, ￿it, ri, ￿i are the rate of time discount, the probability to survive up to time t, the
rate of return on invested wealth and a parameter (or set of parameters) which characterize
the period utility function of individual i (e.g., its elasticity of substitution), while Wit and Cit
stand for its wealth and consumption in period t. If on the contrary agent i accepts our deal,
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While this is basically the end of the story from a fully rational point of view, one can
enrich the framework to take behavioural factors into account. We assume in particular that




where Zi represents a vector of variables capturing the role of ￿nancial literacy and education.
To move from the theoretical model to the data, we make two further assumptions: (1)
the choice also involves a stochastic element: in particular, the agent chooses the lump sum if
it is greater than or equal to LS￿(Xi) + ￿0Zi + "i, "i being a normal random variable; (2) the
function LS￿(Xi) can be approximated by a linear function: LS￿(Xi) = ￿
0Xi.
Let us now indicate Yi our dependent variable (the degree of annuity preference of
individual i). As we remarked above, Yi=1 if i always chooses the lump sum, Yi=2 if i
prefers a 80,000 euro lump sum to the annuity, but prefers the annuity to the 60,000 euro lump
sum, Yi=3 if i prefers a 100,000 euro lump sum to the annuity, but prefers the annuity to the15
80,000 lump sum, and Yi=4 if i always chooses the annuity. Then, one has:
Pr(Yi = 1jXi;Zi) = Pr(￿
0Xi + ￿
0Zi + "i < 60;000)
= Pr("i < 60;000 ￿ ￿
0Xi ￿ ￿
0Zi)
= ￿(60;000 ￿ ￿
0Xi ￿ ￿
0Zi)
where ￿ is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. In the same way, one
has:
Pr(Yi = 2jXi;Zi) = ￿(80;000 ￿ ￿
0Xi ￿ ￿
0Zi) ￿ ￿(60;000 ￿ ￿
0Xi ￿ ￿
0Zi)
Pr(Yi = 3jXi;Zi) = ￿(100;000 ￿ ￿
0Xi ￿ ￿
0Zi) ￿ ￿(80;000 ￿ ￿
0Xi ￿ ￿
0Zi)
Pr(Yi = 4jXi;Zi) = 1 ￿ ￿(100;000 ￿ ￿
0Xi ￿ ￿
0Zi):
This is an ordered probit model which we can estimate using standard maximum-likelihood
techniques (see Wooldridge, 2002).
3.2 Main results
Our estimates mostly con￿rm the ￿ndings of the univariate analysis (Table 4).
14 Contrary
to what the theory predicts, gender, marital status, the presence of children and risk aversion
do not in￿uence annuity demand. Instead, bad health and a low level of income and ￿nancial
wealthreduceannuitypreferencesinastatisticallysigni￿cantway, aspredictedbythetheory.
15
Formal education and all our proxies for ￿nancial literacy are signi￿cant. In particular, as we
expected, understanding the asset diversi￿cation principle reduces the propensity to annuitize.
The contrary is true for schooling and for the other literacy variables (i.e. understanding the
effects of in￿ation and understanding how private pension schemes work).
14 In all the reported estimations, we use survey weights to ensure that the results are valid for the underlying
population. The use of weights in order to correct for unequal probabilities of selection among sampling units
is discussed, among others, in Deaton (1997). The weighting scheme adopted in the Bank of Italy Survey is
explained in detail in Faiella and Gambacorta (2007).
15 In an early version of the regressions we added real estate wealth among the regressors but, contrary to
￿nancial wealth - which is more liquid - it is never signi￿cant, so we dropped it from our preferred speci￿cation.16
To assess the economic/quantitative importance of the independent variables, in Table 4
we also look at how they affect the probability of not being a Yi = 1 individual (symmetrically,
in the table we also provide the effect on the probability of being a Yi = 4 individual). The
effect is particularly sizeable in the case of wealth and schooling. The probability of rejecting
theannuityevenagainstthelowestlumpsumis6.7percentagepointslowerforanindividualin
the second income quartile than for an individual in the ￿rst quartile; it is 6.0 percentage points
lower for an individual with a high school diploma than for an individual who only completed
the lower secondary school. Concerning ￿nancial literacy, the effect on the probability of
accepting the annuity in exchange for the lowest lump sum is also sizeable.
To further illustrate the economic signi￿cance of the effects, we can compute and
confront the estimated demand schedule for individuals with different characteristics. For
example, let us consider an individual holding a bachelor’s degree, who is in the highest wealth
quartile, and has the highest possible scores in all dimensions of ￿nancial literacy.
16 This
individual is the one who, according to the estimated model, displays the highest propensity
to annuitize.
17 Indeed, they display a very strong annuity demand at all prices (their estimated
probability of buying an annuity even at the highest price is 54.7%, increasing to 82.1% against
a lump sum of 80,000 and to 91.0% against a lump sum of 60,000 euros). We can then
compare our benchmark with other individuals who are similar in all respects except that:
(1) they belong to the lowest wealth quartile: this implies that the probability of going for the
annuity at the mid price goes down from 82.1% to 75.8%; or (2) have only a lower secondary
school diploma (the probability of choosing the annuity at the mid price is equal to 72.7%);
or (3) get the worst possible scores in all the dimensions of ￿nancial literacy (in this case, the
probability of choosing the annuity at the mid price is 79.9%). An individual who differs from
the benchmark for all three aspects has a probability of choosing the annuity at the mid price
equal to only 62.8% (Figure 1).
The annuity demand appears to be quite elastic with respect to prices. It is particularly
so at high prices and for the most vulnerable people: it is 33% for our benchmark, 39% for
a person belonging to the lowest wealth quartile, 41% for one having only a primary school
16 This individual is male, married with children, in good health, with an average degree of risk aversion,
and is over 60 years old.
17 Of course, the choice of the benchmark is quite arbitrary, and it only matters as a way to clarify and show
the results of the multivariate analysis.17
diploma, 35% for a person with low pension literacy, and arrives at almost 50% for a person
which has all these three characteristics at the same time (i.e. in the lowest wealth quartile, no
high school diploma, and very poor ￿nancial literacy).
18
3.3 Robustness checks and the role of the intertemporal discount rate
The results of the previous section do not change if we enlarge the sample to consider
all the respondents (therefore including those above 65).
As a further exercise, we restrict the sample to respondents in the 51-65 age bracket.
This is potentially interesting because for these individuals the values of most variables should
be very close to the (subjectively) expected values at retirement.
In this regression, some differences emerge with respect to the baseline (Table 5). On the
one hand, the role of children now appears to be signi￿cantly negative, lending some support to
the argument that informal within-family arrangements can be seen as a substitute for market-
provided insurance against longevity risk. This mechanism might be attenuated when using
our baseline sample simply because many younger respondents included in the larger sample
plan or expect to increase their number of children (therefore, for these respondents the actual
number of children is a poor proxy of the expected number of children at retirement). On the
other hand, health loses signi￿cance, and education, while still signi￿cant, seems to play a
lesser role.
We also estimate a richer speci￿cation (see Table 6), in which we add our proxy for
the discount rate to the independent variables. This comes at the cost of a much lower
number of observations, as the question concerning the discount rate was posed only to a
(randomized) subset of respondents. It turns out that, as expected, a higher discount rate
implies lower annuity demand. Instead, health and two out of three ￿nancial literacy variables
(the exception being the one about risk diversi￿cation) lose their signi￿cance. This suggests
that the correlation between ￿nancial literacy and annuity demand is partly due to the fact that
a low discount rate has a positive impact not only on the latter (as predicted by the standard
life cycle theory) but also on the former, as those who do not care about future well-being are
unlikely to invest time and effort in acquiring ￿nancial knowledge.
19
18 As in the previous exercise, all these individuals are, in all other respects, similar to the benchmark.
19 As an aside, let us remark that the fact that the coef￿cient on health also loses signi￿cance is consistent18
Quantitatively, the effect of a higher discount rate is paramount: with respect to an
individual with a "very low" or "low" discount rate, the probability of choosing the annuity
rather than the 60,000 euro lump sum is increased by 7.1 percentage points if the discount rate
is "medium", by 16.0 percentage points if it is "high", and by 25.8 percentage points if it is
"very high".
To summarize, across all the samples and speci￿cations that we used, the importance of
wealth, schooling and (to a lesser extent) ￿nancial literacy is con￿rmed.
4. Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper, we measured the strength of annuity demand at retirement using a sample
representative of the Italian heads of household, adopting an empirical strategy able to control
for differences in annuitized wealth, prices and other product characteristics.
On average, we ￿nd that there is a strong demand for annuity products (at least with
respect to the one that we observe today, at current market prices).
20
However, our empirical analysis highlights that this statement requires important
quali￿cations. Indeed we have also shown that for poorer, less educated individuals annuity
demand is signi￿cantly lower than average, and the price elasticity of annuity demand is
signi￿cantly higher. These individuals are also those that, without an annuity, are more likely
to end up with insuf￿cient resources if they happen to live longer than they expected. This
would in turn increase old-age poverty and/or welfare spending. It is quite likely that the
annuity demand of these vulnerable subgroups is sub-optimal, either because they cannot
understand the importance of insurance against longevity risk, or because they are prevented
from taking advantage of longevity insurance due to stringent liquidity constraints.
21 It seems
with the view that one’s health is determined by one’s investments in "health capital", which in turn negatively
depend on the personal discount rate (see Grossman, 2000).
20 At the moment, the Italian annuity market is very small (Guazzarotti and Tommasino, 2008). The amount
of annuity purchases, either by individuals or by pension funds, is small. While exact ￿gures concerning single-
premium immediate annuities (i.e., the plain vanilla annuity product that we study in the present paper) are
not available, the number of deferred annuities (which bundle together an investment product and an option to
convert the ￿nal wealth into an annuity) which are in the pay-out phase was only about 15,000 in 2006. Even if
this number is increasing (almost a third of outstanding contracts were signed in 2005), in the 2003-05 period,
out of 1,940,000 deferred annuities contracts which became due, only 11,000 investors preferred the annuity to
the lump sum.
21 Under-annuitization can be socially inef￿cient even if it is ef￿cient from an individual point of view:19
therefore that a case can be made for public policies that help these groups to increase the
annuitized fraction of their retirement wealth.
How can this be done? Policies which prevent annuity prices from increasing too much
above their actuarially fair benchmark are the obvious ￿rst step. Indeed, there is by now ample
evidence, coming from different national markets, that this is not so.
22 To curb excessively
high prices, governments should foster competition among insurance companies and at the
same time should help them manage the aggregate component of the longevity risk.
23 Public
provision of annuities could also be ef￿ciency-enhancing, as the State could sell annuities at a
price nearer to the actuarially fair one (with respect to private insurance companies, it would
be in a better position to manage the aggregate longevity risk, and would probably have lower
administrative and marketing costs).
24 Increasing the reach of adequate ￿nancial education
represents a second potentially fruitful policy. In particular, governments should promote not
only programs aimed at providing basic ￿nancial skills, but also speci￿c programs concerning
pension-related topics, in order to raise awareness of retirement needs and longevity risk. As
a policy of last resort, the minimum fraction of pension wealth which has to be annuitized at
retirement could be mandatorily increased.
25
for example it might be rational for the individual to cash-out pension wealth and spend it immediately after
retirement, thereafter relying on social assistance.
22 See Brown et al. (1999, 2001) for the USA, Cannon and Tonks (2004, 2008) and Finkelstein and Poterba
(2004) for the UK, Guazzarotti and Tommasino (2008) for Italy. James and Song (2002) provide data for a large
group of countries.
23 For example by promoting the timely release of accurate life tables or by providing adequate amounts of
very-long-term bonds and longevity bonds, as suggested by Visco (2006).
24 A similar arrangement has been adopted in Sweden, where the State has a monopoly over annuity provi-
sion.
25 This policy would probably improve the welfare of investors with behavioural biases. On the other hand,
it also entails costs, as some individuals could turn out to be over-annuitized.References
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Table 1: Summary statistics.







Sex Literacy 2 (risk diversification)
Male 3,346 70.4 Incorrect answer 2,359 49.7
Female 1,404 29.6 Correct answer 2,391 50.3
Age Literacy 3 (private pensions)
<= 30 231 4.9 Very poor 1,707 35.9
31-40 866 18.2 Poor 882 18.6
41-50 1,466 30.9 Fair 1,027 21.6
51-65 2,187 46.0 Good 948 20.0
Very good 186 3.9
Marital status Discount rate
Married 3,419 72.0 Very low 755 30.7
Single 659 13.9 Low 504 20.5
Divorced 472 9.9 Medium 517 21.0
Widowed 200 4.2 High 291 11.8
Very high 390 15.9
Number of children Excluded from the module 2,293 48.3
0 1,833 38.6
1 1,297 27.3 Risk aversion
2 1,248 26.3 Low 816 17.2
3+ 372 7.8 Medium 1,773 37.3
High 2,161 45.5
Health
Less than good 664 14.0 Labour income
Good 2,673 56.3 First quartile 669 14.1
Very good 1,411 29.7 Second quartile 1,302 27.4
Third quartile 1,433 30.2
Education Last quartile 1,346 28.3
Primary 579 12.2
Lower Secondary 1,642 34.6 Financial wealth
Secondary 1,944 40.9 First quartile 1,107 23.3
Bachelor's or higher degree 585 12.3 Second quartile 1,193 25.1
Third quartile 1,198 25.2
Literacy 1 (real interest rate) Last quartile 1,252 26.4
Incorrect answer 954 20.1
Correct answer 3,796 79.9 Total 4,750 100.0
Source: SHIW 2008.24
Table 2: Summary statistics.








Male 4,699 57.6 Primary 479 5.9
Female 3,453 42.4 Lower Secondary 2,628 32.2




<= 30 1,693 20.8
31-40 2,450 30.1
41-50 2,448 30.0 Risk aversion
51-65 1,561 19.2 Low 1,300 15.95
Medium 2,932 35.97
Marital status High 3,919 48.08
Married 4,862 59.6
Single 2,671 32.8 Labour income
Divorced 512 6.3 First quartile 319 3.92
Widower 107 1.3 Second quartile 2,235 27.42
Third quartile 2,606 31.97
Number of children Last quartile 2,991 36.70
0 2,149 26.4
1 2,496 30.6 Financial wealth
2 2,635 32.3 First quartile 1,949 23.91
3+ 873 10.7 Second quartile 2,171 26.64
Third quartile 2,038 25.00
Health Last quartile 1,994 24.46
Less than good 635 7.8
Good 4,489 55.1
Very good 3,024 37.1 Total 8,152 100.0
Source: SHIW 2008.25
Table 3: Demand for annuities - Participants who prefer the annuity to the lump sum.
(Heads of household 65 or younger)
60,000 80,000 100,000 60,000 80,000 100,000
All respondents 81.9 69.4 39.9 3,891 3,296 1,897
Sex
Male 82.1 70.1 40.8 2,738 2,339 1,362
Female 81.5 67.6 37.8 1,154 956 535
Age
<= 30 77.8 63.5 30.3 180 147 70
31-40 77.4 64.3 33.4 671 557 289
41-50 81.9 69.9 39.1 1,201 1,025 574
51-65 85.5 73.3 46.6 1,870 1,602 1,019
Marital status
Married 82.1 69.6 40.8 2,806 2,381 1,394
Single 82.8 68.7 36.3 545 453 239
Divorced 81.2 70.8 40.2 383 334 190
Widowed 77.6 64.0 40.4 155 128 81
Number of children
0 82.3 68.9 38.8 1,508 1,262 711
1 83.1 72.0 42.4 1,078 934 550
2 81.3 68.9 39.6 1,015 860 495
3+ 78.1 65.0 39.0 290 242 145
Health
Less than good 78.7 62.7 35.5 523 416 235
Good 82.3 69.8 38.6 2,199 1,867 1,030
Very good 82.7 71.5 44.6 1,167 1,009 629
Education
Primary 77.9 63.5 32.0 411 335 169
Lower Secondary 79.8 64.2 33.4 1,278 1,029 535
Higher Secondary 83.9 72.9 43.8 1,607 1,396 838
Bachelor's or higher degree 83.4 76.5 50.0 480 441 288
Source: SHIW 2008. (cont.)
Lump sum Lump sum
number of respondents percentage of respondents26
Table 3: Demand for annuities - Participants who prefer the annuity to the lump sum (cont.).
60,000 80,000 100,000 60,000 80,000 100,000
Literacy 1 (real interest rate)
Incorrect answer 78.1 62.0 32.1 745 592 306
Correct answer 82.9 71.3 42.0 3,148 2,707 1,595
Literacy 2 (risk diversification)
Incorrect answer 81.5 68.5 42.7 1,923 1,616 1,008
Correct answer 82.3 70.2 37.3 1,968 1,679 892
Literacy 3 (private pensions)
Very poor 76.7 61.7 34.0 1,309 1,054 581
Poor 84.0 72.0 43.8 741 635 386
Fair 84.6 74.4 39.5 869 764 406
Good 86.0 75.1 46.6 816 712 442
Very good 89.7 77.6 50.1 167 144 93
Discount rate
Very low 86.8 76.3 54.9 656 576 415
Low 91.0 85.9 49.5 459 433 250
Medium 85.7 72.8 31.0 443 376 160
High 77.0 57.4 23.3 224 167 68
Very high 57.6 44.2 20.9 225 172 81
Excluded from the module 82.2 68.5 40.3 1,885 1,571 924
Risk aversion
Low 82.6 72.2 45.0 674 589 367
Medium 83.6 71.7 38.7 1,482 1,271 687
High 80.4 66.7 39.2 1,738 1,442 847
Labour income
First quartile 77.0 62.6 37.3 915 743 443
Second quartile 82.6 66.4 35.5 1,009 811 433
Third quartile 82.7 72.7 38.5 957 841 446
Last quartile 85.1 75.9 49.1 1,008 899 581
Financial wealth
First quartile 72.2 56.3 29.8 858 669 354
Second quartile 84.5 70.7 41.3 1,003 839 491
Third quartile 85.6 73.8 42.7 1,046 902 521
Last quartile 85.9 78.0 47.0 991 899 542
Source: SHIW 2008.
Lump sum Lump sum
percentage of respondents number of respondents27
Table 4: Demand for annuities: ordered probit model.
(Heads of Household 65 or younger)
Parameters
estimates
Marginal effects on the
probability of rejecting
the annuity even at the
lowest lump sum
Marginal effects on the
probability of choosing
the annuity even at the
highest lump sum
Sex
Female - - -
Male -0.0565 0.0143 -0.0208
Age (years)
<= 30 - - -
31-40 0.0048 -0.0014 0.0017
41-50 0.1855* -0.0509* 0.0667*
51-65 0.3777*** -0.0957*** 0.1392***
Marital status
Unmarried - - -
Married -0.0697 0.0172 -0.0258
Children
No children - - -
One or more children 0.0055 -0.0014 0.002
Health
Less than good - - -
Good 0.0918 -0.0243 0.0333
Very good 0.1966*** -0.0498*** 0.0723***
Risk aversion
Low - - -
Medium 0.0625 -0.0165 0.0227
High 0.0996 -0.0258 0.0363
Financial wealth
First quartile - - -
Second quartile 0.2634*** -0.0692*** 0.0966***
Third quartile 0.2572*** -0.0677*** 0.0943***
Last quartile 0.2141*** -0.0574*** 0.078***
Labour income
First quartile - - -
Second quartile 0.1697*** -0.0442*** 0.0624***
Third quartile 0.1494** -0.0393** 0.0548**
Last quartile 0.2122*** -0.0543*** 0.0784***
Education
Primary - - -
Lower Secondary 0.0512 -0.0143 0.0183
Higher Secondary 0.2344*** -0.0607*** 0.0861***
Bachelor's or higher degree 0.3082*** -0.0773*** 0.1141***
Literacy 1 (real interest rate)
Incorrect answer - - -
Correct answer 0.1458** -0.0379** 0.0533***
Literacy 2 (risk diversification)
Incorrect answer - - -
Correct answer -0.2296*** 0.0572*** -0.0844***
Literacy 3 (private pension)
1 correct answer 0.1775*** -0.0449*** 0.0657***
2 correct answers 0.0944 -0.0248 0.0346
3 correct answers 0.1951*** -0.049*** 0.0724***
4 correct answers 0.2752** -0.0667*** 0.1029**
Number of observations 4,748 4,748 4,748
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.030 0.030
Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**), 10% (*).28
Table 5: Demand for annuities: ordered probit model.
(Heads of household, between 51 and 65)
Parameters
estimates
Marginal effects on the
probability of rejecting the
annuity even at the lowest
lump sum
Marginal effects on the
probability of choosing the
annuity even at the highest
lump sum
Sex
Female - - -
Male -0.1212 0.0263 -0.0459
Age (years)
<= 30 - - -
31-40 - - -
41-50 - - -
51-65 - - -
Marital status
Unmarried - - -
Married -0.0068 0.0015 -0.0026
Children
No children - - -
One or more children -0.1537** 0.0334** -0.0582**
Health
Less than good - - -
Good 0.063 -0.0137 0.0239
Very good 0.1627 -0.0353 0.0617
Risk aversion
Low - - -
Medium -0.0842 0.0183 -0.0319
High -0.0287 0.0062 -0.0109
Financial wealth
First quartile - - -
Second quartile 0.2059** -0.0447** 0.078**
Third quartile 0.3287*** -0.0713*** 0.1245***
Last quartile 0.3374*** -0.0732*** 0.1278***
Labour income
First quartile - - -
Second quartile 0.2426*** -0.0527*** 0.0919***
Third quartile 0.2368** -0.0514** 0.0897**
Last quartile 0.4167*** -0.0905*** 0.1579***
Education
Primary - - -
Lower Secondary 0.058 -0.0126 0.022
Higher Secondary 0.1552* -0.0337* 0.0588*
Bachelor's or higher degree 0.1493 -0.0324 0.0566
Literacy 1 (real interest rate)
Incorrect answer - - -
Correct answer 0.062 -0.0135 0.0235
Literacy 2 (risk diversification)
Incorrect answer - - -
Correct answer -0.2883*** 0.0626*** -0.1092***
Literacy 3 (private pension)
1 correct answer 0.2674*** -0.058*** 0.1013***
2 correct answers -0.0687 0.0149 -0.026
3 correct answers -0.0117 0.0025 -0.0044
4 correct answers 0.4122** -0.0895** 0.1562**
Number of observations 2,186 2,186 2,186
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.031 0.031
Significance levels: 1% (***); 5% (**), 10% (*).29
Table 6: Demand for annuities: ordered probit model controlling for the discount rate.
(Heads of household 65 or younger)
Parameters
estimates
Marginal effects on the
probability of rejecting the
annuity even at the lowest
lump sum
Marginal effects on the
probability of choosing the
annuity even at the highest
lump sum
Sex
Female - - -
Male -0.0449 0.0106 -0.0156
Age (years)
<= 30 - - -
31-40 -0.1751 0.0489 -0.0576
41-50 0.1144 -0.0288 0.0396
51-65 0.4072*** -0.0908** 0.1451***
Marital status
Unmarried - - -
Married -0.0016 0.0004 -0.0006
Children
No children - - -
One or more children -0.0401 0.0094 -0.014
Health
Less than good - - -
Good 0.0381 -0.0091 0.0132
Very good 0.0885 -0.0208 0.0307
Risk aversion
Low - - -
Medium -0.3695 0.0757 -0.131
High -0.3625 0.074 -0.1286
Financial wealth
First quartile - - -
Second quartile 0.2748*** -0.0662*** 0.0955***
Third quartile 0.2585*** -0.0627*** 0.0896***
Last quartile 0.1177 -0.0301 0.0401
Labour income
First quartile - - -
Second quartile 0.1029 -0.0239 0.0359
Third quartile -0.0088 0.0021 -0.003
Last quartile 0.0719 -0.0169 0.025
Education
Primary - - -
Lower Secondary 0.225** -0.0583** 0.0755**
Higher Secondary 0.3547*** -0.0875*** 0.1211***
Bachelor's or higher degree 0.1251 -0.0336 0.0413
Literacy 1 (real interest rate)
Incorrect answer - - -
Correct answer 0.1191 -0.0287 0.0412
Literacy 2 (risk diversification)
Incorrect answer - - -
Correct answer -0.186*** 0.0433*** -0.0645***
Literacy 3 (private pension)
1 correct answer 0.0524 -0.0124 0.0182
2 correct answers -0.0056 0.0014 -0.0019
3 correct answers 0.1329 -0.0305 0.0465
4 correct answers 0.1976 -0.0442 0.0695
Discount rate
Very low - - -
Low 0.0141 -0.0025 0.0054
Medium -0.3348*** 0.0713*** -0.1256***
High -0.6472*** 0.1596*** -0.2321***
Very high -0.9365*** 0.2575*** -0.3149***
Number of observations 2,455 2,455 2,455
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.070 0.07030
Figure 1: Probability of choosing the annuity as a function of price.
(The benchmark individual is male, married, with children, in good health, with an average degree of risk
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